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THE LIFE AND
DEATH OF SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE
Louis van den Hengel
Becoming Undone: Darwinian
Reflections on Life, Politics, and
Art by Elizabeth Grosz. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press,
2011. Pp. 264. $84.95 cloth; $23.95
paper.

In Becoming Undone, Elizabeth
Grosz connects Charles Darwin’s
account of biological evolution as
an unpredictable and open-ended
process of variation to the philosophies of Henri Bergson, Gilles
Deleuze, and Luce Irigaray in
order to elaborate a more or less
neomaterialist ontology of sexual
difference as the engine of natural existence, the vital mechanism
productive of the complexity and
excesses of life as we may or may
not know it. The book is set over
and against what Grosz perceives
as a postmodern feminism in which
notions of nature and matter have
been sidelined, and where, more
precisely, ontological inquiries into
the constitution of life have been
subsumed under epistemological considerations of how bodies
come to matter exclusively in terms
of language, discourse, and culture. Grosz, in contrast, develops
a Darwinian feminism and a postmodern Darwinism that attempts
to rethink the materiality of sexual
difference through the inhuman
time of evolutionary becoming.
Whereas feminist theorists have
generally been reluctant to engage
with Darwinian thought beyond
the scope of epistemological critique, Grosz’s work takes a different and more affirmative approach.
The aim of Becoming Undone is
not to address the androcentrism
apparent in Darwin’s theory of evolution, nor to assess the essentialist
approaches to sexual and racial
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differences within neo-Darwinian
sociobiology or evolutionary psychology, but rather to take hold of
what in Darwin’s work is useful for
the elaboration of feminist thought
beyond postmodern theories of
power and difference, and past the
limits of egalitarian politics of recognition. Against this background,
Grosz advances a philosophy of
life and matter as deeply attuned
not only to each other but to the
generative force of duration—the
becoming and unbecoming—
through which biological evolution
proceeds as an open-ended process
of differentiation, especially sexual
differentiation.
Starting from the basic
Darwinian insight that the differences between humans and other
animal species, as well as among
human beings, are differences in
degree and not in kind, Grosz uses
the philosophies of Bergson and
Deleuze to theorize evolutionary
emergence not merely as a relation between different forms of
life but as a dynamic entanglement
between life and the inorganic
forces of matter. Life and matter
are conceptualized not as binary
opposites but as divergent tendencies or trajectories, two different
degrees of the same, ever-differing,
force of duration: the temporal or
evolutionary impulse that enables
life to actualize the “vital indeterminacy” (34) of the material world
from which it emerges, to unfold
the dynamic unpredictability that is

folded into matter as the potential
to become different. This nonteleological reading of Darwin is directly
opposed to the traditions of social
Darwinism that tend to reduce all
evolutionary mechanisms to the
teleological principle of survival—a
reduction that has on more than one
occasion facilitated a classification
of humanity as the pinnacle of creation that runs counter to Darwin’s
own work. Indeed, Grosz posits a
fundamental continuity between
individuals and species of all kinds,
not because they share a common
genealogy, but because all of life is
enjoined in the transformation of
matter. Grosz’s Darwinism, then,
is a highly Deleuzian one in which
evolution is construed as a transversal force of creative transformation, an impersonal cut across the
boundaries between organic and
inorganic vitality, an unpredictable
and increasingly complex elaboration of life as the power to differ.
If, as Deleuze has suggested,
“Darwin’s great novelty was that
of inaugurating the thought of
individual difference,”1 Grosz
seizes upon Darwin’s idea that it
is sexual difference, in the form of
sexual selection, through which
life first elaborates itself as a continuous process of variation and
creative excess. It is through her
philosophical exploration of the
relation between sexual and natural selection in Darwin’s writings,
and her subsequent elaboration
of a dynamic ontology of sexual
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divergence, that Grosz’s Darwin
emerges not only as a decisive
theorist of becoming, but—unwittingly—as “the first feminist of
difference” (142). As unexpected a
designation this may be for someone whose vision of evolution regularly attests to the biological and
social inferiority of women, and
whose personal views about sexual
difference may be summed up by
a calculated list of marriage’s pros
and cons describing female companionship as slightly preferable to
owning a dog,2 Grosz convincingly
shows how Darwin’s open-ended
understanding of nature and matter as constitutive of vital transformations may become central to the
elaboration of a nonanthropocentric feminism of difference, a “new
kind of feminism” (57) that reworks
the problem of sexual difference in
the bio-ontological context of “animal becomings and the becomings
microscopic and imperceptible that
regulate matter itself” (86).
Like in her previous work,
Grosz frames the invocation of the
concepts of nature, matter, and life
as a turn—or return—to a “more
archaic” but also “more modernist” tradition that has been largely
neglected in feminist theory (59).
The call to reclaim matter—not
the materiality of the body, but the
biological dynamism from which
all bodies emerge—from its perceived absence in feminist theory
after the cultural turn is of course
not new, but has pervaded, in an
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increasingly mundane fashion,
feminist scholarship from the 1990s
onwards. Grosz, however, hardly
engages with any of the new material feminisms that have emerged
as a response to this call, which is
one of the reasons why, although
I am fully committed to what she
has called the “forgotten question of
ontology,”3 I remain unconvinced
by the rhetorical gestures that
underpin the urgency with which
that question is posed. There are
few specific references to feminist
scholarship in Becoming Undone,
and Grosz’s repeated criticisms
of “feminist egalitarianism” and
“postmodern feminism” are not
substantiated by in-depth readings
of whatever theorists are supposed
to be filed under these extremely
elastic concepts. The book as a
whole lacks much of the meticulous
engagement with feminist theory
that characterized Grosz’s earliest
work. The assertion that “concepts
of autonomy, agency, and freedom
. . . are continuously evoked in feminist theory” but “have been rarely
defined, explained, or analyzed”
(59), for example, is overly generalized at best, while observations
about feminism’s “submersion in
the politics of representation” (85)
and “the overwhelming dominance
of identity politics” (89) sound curiously quaint in light of Grosz’s own
insistence, in the same chapter,
that what is principally at stake in
feminist theory is the invention of
the new.
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If Becoming Undone provides
a foundation for future feminist thought, it is not through its
account of recent feminist history,
but by means of Grosz’s interpretation of evolutionary theory as a way
to rethink the materiality of sexual
difference as an entanglement of—
rather than interaction between—
the biological, the cultural, and the
social.4 To this end, Grosz revisits
Irigaray’s conception of sexual difference—as an irreducible ontological d
 ifference—through Darwin’s
account of sexual selection. Darwin
introduced the concept of sexual
selection in part to explain the origins of phenomena that cannot
be attributed to natural selection,
such as the differences in appearance between male and female animals, the operations of erotic appeal
and attraction, and the presence of
beauty in the natural world. Sexual
selection hence accounts for the evolution of features without any particular survival value, such as large
antlers or ornate peacock feathers,
which are primarily directed to the
attainment of sexual partners. Since
sexual selection is independent from
the logic of reproduction—even if it
may lead to reproductive success—
Grosz views it as a strategy to maximize difference or variation itself,
to proliferate differences for the
sake of beauty and pleasure alone,
for the intensification of nothing
but pure difference.
Grosz thus acknowledges a
rich feminist potential in Darwin’s

work by reading it as a Deleuzian
feminist analysis of difference
avant la lettre. More importantly,
the notion of sexual selection in
her view explains the persistence
of sexual difference as an ontological force in the evolution of life. It
is at this point, argues Grosz, that
“feminists who are committed to
the concept of the irreducible difference between the sexes,” such
as Irigaray, “may find in Darwin’s
writings surprising confirmation
of their claims” (156). This is a
compelling statement, and yet the
interweaving of Irigaray’s ontology of sexual difference with a
Deleuzian–Darwinian
understanding of evolution is not without problems. The most important
difficulties, in my view, arise from
Grosz’s tendency to contain the
vital indeterminacy of matter—its
infinite potential for change and
transformation—within a binary of
sexual difference that is understood
as ontologically impossible to overcome. Since, as Grosz has claimed
elsewhere, “sexual selection differentiates all species touched by its
trace with an irreducible binarism
that itself generates endless variety
on either side of its bifurcation,”5
life on earth in her view consists in
the elaboration of multiple lines of
development that cannot proceed
without the irreducible existence
of at least two types of being. Yet if
physical forms of evolution occur
through the nonteleological force
of duration, and if sexual selection
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is governed not by sexual reproduction but by the unpredictable forces
of aesthetic choice and appeal, why
does Grosz need to posit an irreducible ontological binarism as the
sine qua non of biological and cultural differentiation?
In fact, Grosz’s own neomaterialist Darwinism—if taken to its
logical conclusion—would seem
to imply a rather opposite understanding of sexual difference as a
process of ontological differentiation irreducible to any sexual binarism. Grosz a priori rejects this
view,6 which leads to a curiously
unresolved tension between her
open-ended reading of evolutionary unfolding on the one hand and
her affirmation of the ontomateriality of binary sexual difference on
the other. The crucial point here, as
Luciana Parisi has astutely noted, is
that if the evolution of sex is truly
considered as a form of process—
that is, if it is conceptualized from
a radical empiricist perspective—
then “the biological formation of
two sexes may coincide not with
the ontological duration of sexual
difference but . . . with an accident,
an event in evolution.”7 By grounding the becoming and unbecoming
of life in a model of two irreducible sexes, Grosz fails to attend not
to the potentially infinite expressions of sexual difference per se,
but to the myriad forms of sex that
run beneath the figure of the two,
the “infinitesimal number of differential sexes that are completely
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determined and yet do not exactly
constitute the biology of sexual difference.”8 In this way, Grosz’s neomaterialist philosophy of life in its
virtual multiplicity, its openness
to “the irresistible future of sexual
difference” (101), paradoxically
ends up denying the unpredictable
nature of sexual evolution.
That Grosz, in light of the endless variation generated through
sexual difference as an evolutionary
force, continues to cast this difference in terms of ontological duality
rather than irreducible multiplicity cannot be divorced from her
concentration on the later work
of Irigaray. As many critics have
noted, Irigaray’s oeuvre is split
into an earlier phase and a later
phase: whereas the former develops a fluid philosophy of difference
as not-One, the latter asserts the
duality of sexual difference at the
increasing expense of sexual and
natural multiplicity.9 More importantly, this later work affirms what
Rosi Braidotti has called “the metaphysics of two” from a distinctly
heterosexual, or at least heterosocial, perspective.10 In I Love to
You (1996), for example, Irigaray
unambiguously positions the male–
female relationship as the paradigmatic model for the “mysterious”
force of sexual difference, and even
turns the heterosexual couple into
the privileged site for the development of ethical social relations,
feminist politics, and the creativity of life itself.11 Although Grosz,
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with Irigaray, acknowledges that
sexual difference cannot be contained within the sexual identities
of male and female as they are presently lived or actualized, she seems
to take no issue with the latter’s
conviction that the affirmation of
sexual difference, if it is to be truly
ethical, “will come from the evolution, the revolution in the relations
between man and woman, first and
foremost in the couple.”12 Becoming
Undone instead takes the bifurcation between male and female,
effected through sexual selection,
as the primary mechanism through
which the evolution of life proceeds
in “two different incalculable directions” (141).
I do not want to imply at this
point that Grosz’s conception of the
natural as “never one but always
at least two” (149) reproduces
normative heterosexuality at the

ontomaterial level of life itself. The
problem rather lies in the residual
organicism of Grosz’s conception of evolution. It is precisely
to the extent that Grosz locates
the force of sexual difference in
the complexification of organic
life that her attachment to a late-
Irigarayan ontology of sexual difference—perceived as a duality
that “inscribes finitude in the natural itself”13—closes down what her
Deleuzian reading of Darwin had
so creatively opened up: the infinite
potentiality of matter to unfold a
qualitative multiplicity of sexes,
a proliferation of sex events that

cannot be adequately addressed
through the notion of sexual difference as “(at least) two” (104). And
while it may be the case that Grosz
uses this remarkably parenthetical
phrase, which recurs throughout
her work, to release some of the
tensions inherent in the encounter between Darwin and Irigaray,
Becoming Undone makes painfully
clear that “(at least) two” does not a
multiplicity make.
The limits of Grosz’s account
of sexual difference become readily apparent in her discussion of
the objections against Irigaray by
Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler.
The latter in particular points to
the “presumptive heterosexuality” in Irigaray’s conception of
ethical exchange, which not only
privileges the sexual over all other
forms of difference but also, as
already noted, frames the generative interval of sexual difference
through a most narrow version of
heterosexual relationality.14 Grosz
does not provide a direct answer
to Butler’s concern that Irigaray
denies the existence of ethically
enabling differences within samesex relationships, but points out
that all sexual relations—no matter
how queer—are affected by sexual
difference. While this in principle
acknowledges same-sex relations as
a locus for the affirmation of sexual
alterity—a much-needed supplement to Irigaray—it also leads to a
curious confession on Grosz’s part:
“I cannot see,” she writes, “how an
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understanding of sexuality, sexual
pleasure, desire, and identity can be
developed which doesn’t discern, as
part of its very operations, the relative values of and attraction to the
particularities of male and female
bodies, organs, and activities” (108).
Unfortunately, this failure to envision sexual difference beyond a
binary frame subsequently translates into a number of contentious
claims about how sexual difference,
as a constitutive difference, supposedly operates in relation to sex, gender, and sexuality.
The full weight of the parenthetical “(at least) two” comes to
bear on Grosz’s interpretation of
intersexuality and transsexuality.
While the former is simply dismissed as confirming rather than
challenging the binary nature of
sexual difference, Grosz considers
the latter as—quoting Irigaray—
the “new opium for the people”
(110). Indeed, she insists that
“however queer, transgendered
[sic], and ethnically identified one
might be, one comes from a man
and a woman, and one remains
a man or a woman, even in the
case of gender-reassignment or
the chemical and surgical transformations of one sex into the
appearance of another” (109–10).
This remarkably strong statement
not only suggests that sexual difference is controlled by bodily
difference—a view inconsistent
with the work of either Irigaray
or Grosz herself—but also comes
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dangerously close to the transphobic assumption that trans individuals may look like “real” men or
women, but can never actually be
the sex with which they identify.
Equally problematic are Grosz’s
claims about nontraditional family arrangements, which under the
pervasive impact of sexual difference in her view inevitably take
a heterosexual form: “The roles
of mommy and daddy are perpetrated even within gay families,”
according to Grosz, “although it
is no longer clear that the mommy
is a woman and the daddy is a
man” (108). While this argument
willfully ignores the possibility
that queer forms of kinship may
transform rather than reproduce
the nuclear family model, it also
remains curiously anthropocentric
in light of Grosz’s own Darwinian
interpretation of sexual difference.
Even when we leave aside that
two-parent families are largely
absent in nonhuman nature, where
single parenting or the absence
of any parental investment is the
norm,15 it remains entirely unclear
how the reproduction of gender
roles rooted in human sociality
would testify to the ontological
persistence of sexual difference as
a nonhuman force.
That Grosz refers to Darwinian
sexual selection as “the queering
of natural selection” (132) diffuses
rather than solves the problem.
While Grosz interestingly places
a queer intensification of bodies
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at the heart of her neomaterialist
reading of sexual evolution, the
strong association of this q
 ueerness
with the “skills of spectacular performance” (125)—the “noisy colorfulness” and “artistic excessiveness”
(126) of the most attractive members of a particular species—is not
theoretically innocent. In effect,
the naming of sexual selection as
queer potentially reinforces the
stereotypical association of queerness—and queer theory—with the
conceptually frivolous and politically unproductive spaces of gender
performativity, erotic pleasure, and
aesthetic display. The establishment of such links between queer
theory and frivolity is actually
central to what Clare Hemmings
has perceptively called the “political grammar” of much contemporary feminist theory, especially
those narratives that, like Grosz’s,
reclaim a “forgotten” materiality or ontology in order to move
beyond the textual abstractions of
the cultural turn.16 Since such narratives are generally marked by an
overassociation of cultural theory
with sexual critique, as Hemmings
demonstrates in admirable detail,
they problematically position
queer theory—often in the person
of Butler—as “the quintessential
opposite” of feminist new materialism, an “anachronistic interruption” that needs to be overcome in
order to regain feminist commitment and political credibility.17 One
of the most pernicious effects of

such reductive textual oppositions,
for Hemmings, is their amenability
to the highly problematic framing
of the sexual in broader postfeminist and antifeminist discourses
far beyond their own theoretical
location.
To be clear, I do not want to
suggest that Grosz’s evolutionary narrative serves to set queer
theory against neomaterialist
feminism—after all, whether
her work has this or precisely the
opposite effect surely depends
on the reader. Nevertheless, the
aforementioned examples are
revealing of the tensions not
only between the Deleuzian–
Darwinian and Irigarayan strands
in Grosz’s work, but more generally between feminist new materialism and queer criticism within
contemporary philosophies of
life. By reading Grosz’s compelling turn towards the evolution
of life and matter in light of the
genealogy of feminist theory and
its discontents, I have attempted
to show how the commitment to
an irreducible binarism of sexual
difference, in tandem with an
affirmation of difference as the
generative force of the living and
nonliving universe, both invokes
and disavows the existence of a
natural multiplicity—a biological queerness, perhaps—that is
just as sexually specific and just
as real, both phenomenologically
and ontologically, as the nature of
sexual duality.

ON BECOMING UNDONE
Grosz’s
work
generously
p rovides the reader with potential
ways out of the dilemmas posed by
its own contradictions, and perhaps
this testifies to its conceptual vitality
and strength. Although Becoming
Undone ultimately does not quite
develop a philosophy of sexual difference as a force of irreducible
multiplicity—the crossing over of
sex into what Deleuze and Guattari
describe as “molecular assemblages
of a different nature”18—it is certainly possible to make the frictions
in Grosz’s work productive to that
end. If Grosz’s theorization of the
life of sexual difference as an ongoing process of human and nonhuman becomings will eventually lead
to the death of sexual difference as
a philosophical concept, then this is
a death only in the most generative
sense: not in terms of a metaphysics of finitude, but as another phase
in an enduring process of material
and conceptual transformation.
The death of sexual difference in
this view consists only and precisely
in its emergence, or reemergence, as
a vital force of qualitative multiplicity, an immanent flow of sexual differing in its infinite complexity.
Louis van den Hengel is assistant professor
at the Department of Literature and Art
and the Centre for Gender and Diversity at
Maastricht University. His current research
examines the relations between affect,
materiality, and time in contemporary performance art, and focuses on the work of the
Serbian and New York–based artist Marina
Abramović.
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